Not Necessarily Self-Inflicted

Well, Dave Grohl is apparently a satanist, so if Kurt Cobain truly didn’t kill himself, this belated investigation might explain the otherwise inexplicable success of the Foo Fighters:

Now, an unofficial private sector team of forensic scientists has put fresh eyes on Cobain’s autopsy and crime scene materials, bringing in Brian Burnett, a specialist who previously worked on cases involving overdoses followed by gunshot trauma.

Independent researcher Michelle Wilkins, who worked with the team, told Daily Mail that after just three days looking into the evidence with fresh eyes, Burnett said: ‘This is a homicide. We’ve got to do something about this.’

She said the conclusion followed an exhaustive review of the autopsy findings, which revealed signs inconsistent with an instantaneous gunshot death.

The peer-reviewed paper presented ten points of evidence suggesting Cobain was confronted by one or more assailants who forced a heroin overdose to incapacitate him, before one of them shot him in the head, placed the gun in his arms and left behind a forged suicide note.

A lot of black Christians are postulating that a similar deal is why Lebron James is so reluctant to retire, as they believe it won’t be long after retirement before he goes the way of his fellow satanist Kobe Bryant.

Fame and fortune are absolutely not worth it. When Jesus Christ said he would free us from fear, this is one of the things he was talking about. The terror in the eyes of the wicked is a terrible thing, as is the regret you can hear in the voice of some of those who made their deals, got what they wanted, and belatedly realize that no matter what it was, it wasn’t worth it.

Whether it is Jordan Peterson crying on stage, Lebron James wearily trudging up and down the court and taking himself out of the game as soon as he hits double digits, or Bob Dylan talking about the commander of this world, the inevitable is obvious. Sooner or later, the Dark Rider is going to throw you down.

But they merit no mercy and they know it. Because the wicked aren’t merely evil. Long before they pay the ultimate price, they put down the down payment in someone else’s blood. The satanism is worse and more pervasive than you think.

The Russians know it’s pure satanism. We know it’s pure satanism. And every single member of the elite has to be considered suspect and probably guilty until proven innocent. The wicked have rejected the precepts of the Christian West, including being innocent until proven guilty, so they have no right to appeal to them.

DISCUSS ON SG

Recalibrating Man

One of the fascinating things about the Probability Zero project is the way that the desperate attempts of the critics to respond to it have steadily led to the complete collapse of the entire evolutionary house of cards. MITTENS began with the simple observation that 9 million years wasn’t enough time for natural selection to produce 15 million fixations. Then it turned out that there were only 6-7 million years to produce 20 million fixations twice.

After the retreat to neutral theory led to the discovery of the twice-valued variable and the variant invariance, the distinction established between N and N_e led to the recalibration of the molecular clock. And the recalibration of the molecular clock led, inevitably, to the discovery that the evolutionists no longer have 6-7 million years for natural selection and neutral theory to work their magic.

And now they have as little as 200,000 years, with an absolute maximum of 580,000, with which to work. And they still need to account for the full 20 million fixations in the human lineage alone, while recognizing that zero new potential fixations have appeared in the ancient DNA pipeline for the last 7,000 years. Simply pulling on one anomalous string has caused the entire structure to systematically unravel. The whole system proved to be far more fragile than I had any reason to imagine when I first asked that fatal question: what is the average rate of evolution?

So if your minds weren’t blown before, The N/N_e Distinction and the Recalibration of the Human-Chimpanzee Divergence should suffice to do the trick.

Kimura’s (1968) derivation of the neutral substitution rate k = μ rests on the cancellation of population size N between mutation supply (2Nμ) and fixation probability (1/2N). This cancellation is invalid. The mutation supply term uses census N (every individual can mutate), while the fixation probability is governed by effective population size Ne (drift operates on Ne, not N). The corrected substitution rate is k = μ × (N/Ne). Using empirically derived Ne values—human Ne = 3,300 from ancient DNA drift variance (Day & Athos 2026a) and chimpanzee Ne = 33,000 from geographic drift variance across subspecies—we recalibrate the human-chimpanzee divergence date. The consensus molecular clock estimate of 6–7 Mya collapses to 200–580 kya, with the most plausible demographic parameters yielding 200–360 kya. Both Ne estimates are independent of k = μ and independent of the molecular clock. The recalibrated divergence date increases the MITTENS fixation shortfall from ~130,000× to 4–8 million×, rendering the standard model of human-chimpanzee divergence via natural selection mathematically impossible by an additional two orders of magnitude.

There are a number of fascinating implications here, of course. But in the short term, what this immediately demonstrates is that all the heroic efforts of the evolutionary enthusiasts to somehow defend the mathematical possibility of producing 20 million fixations in 6.5 million years were utterly in vain. Because, depending upon how generous you’re feeling, MITTENS just became from 10x to 45x more impossible.

Here is the correct equation to calculate the amount of time for evolution from the initial divergence for any two lineages.

t = D / {μ × [(N_A/N_eA) + (N_B/N_eB)]}

Where:

  • D = observed pairwise sequence divergence
  • μ = per-generation mutation rate (from pedigree data)
  • N_A= census population size of lineage A
  • N_B = census population size of lineage B
  • N_eA = effective population sizes of lineage A (from historical census demographics)
  • N_eB = effective population sizes of lineage B (from historical census demographics)

Which, by the way, finally gives us the answer to the question that I asked at the very start: what is the rate of evolution?

R = μ(N/N_e) / g

This is the number of fixations per site per year. It is the rate of evolution for any lineage from a specific divergence, given the pedigree mutation rate, the census-to-effective population size ratio estimated from historical census demographics, and the generation time in years.

And yes, that means exactly what you suspect it might.

DISCUSS ON SG

China Shuns US Debt

From BRICS News:

JUST IN: China instructs banks to reduce US Treasury holdings.

This isn’t a massive surprise. It’s obviously been in the works for some time; I even wrote about it three years ago. But the quiet reduction from $1.3 trillion to $680 billion has been gradual, while this public announcement may reflect a more aggressive policy of dumping the dollar.

It also suggests that BRICS will very soon unveil an alternative payment structure, not just for the BRICS nations, but for the world. Which, given the fragility of the current US-based payment processing systems, would be a very welcome alternative for many neutral parties.

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: The Treatise 009

X. Transition: The Present Void

The Enlightenment is dead. Its premises have been tested and found wanting. Its political philosophy produced tyranny in the name of freedom, oligarchy in the name of democracy, censorship in the name of liberty. Its economics produced models that do not describe reality and policies that impoverish those they claimed to enrich. Its science produced institutions incapable of correcting their own errors and a theory of life that cannot survive contact with basic arithmetic. Its epistemology consumed itself, beginning with the enthronement of reason and ending with reason’s abdication.

And yet nothing has taken its place.

The modern educated person, the heir of the Enlightenment, the product of its institutions, and speaker of its language, now finds himself in an uncomfortable position. He cannot return to the pre-Enlightenment world; too much has changed, too much has been learned, too many of the old certainties have been genuinely superseded. But he cannot remain in the Enlightenment world either, for that world has been exposed as built on sand. He is suspended between a past he cannot recover and a present he cannot believe.

This suspension is not sustainable. Human beings require coherent frameworks for understanding reality, grounding morality, and orienting action. The borrowed capital of Christendom, upon which the Enlightenment drew even as it denied the debt, has been spent. The contradictions can no longer be papered over. Something must replace what has failed.

But what will replace it. What can replace it.?

The pre-Enlightenment philosophical tradition was Aristotelian, Scholastic, and Christian, avoided the pathologies that have undone modernity. It understood reason as participatory rather than autonomous, as a faculty for apprehending truth rather than constructing it. It grounded rights in the nature of things rather than in social contracts that no one signed. It integrated fact and value, knowledge and goodness, in a unified vision of reality ordered toward transcendent ends. It did not make the errors that the Enlightenment made, and therefore it did not create the series of self-inflicted catastrophes that the Enlightenment has inevitably caused the men of the West to suffer.

But the classical tradition, as it existed before the Enlightenment, is not sufficient for the present need. It was formulated to address questions that were live in the thirteenth century; since then it has ossified and has not been adequately developed to address the questions that challenge Man today. It failed to seriously resist the rise of the Enlightenment, in part due to the false promises of the Enlightenment, in part because it had grown rigid, defensive, and backward-looking, more concerned with preserving past formulations than with pursuing present truth. A tradition that neglects to evolve to meet present and future challenges is a tradition that is unlikely to endure.

What is needed is neither a return to the pre-modern tradition or modern philosophies, but something new: a philosophical framework that recovers the structure and coherence of traditional thought while incorporating what has been genuinely learned in recent centuries, an intellectual structure that avoids the errors of the Enlightenment without ignoring the challenges it raised, a conceptual architecture that not only offers a critique of what has failed but provides a positive vision for what actually works to build successful societies and a healthy, thriving civilization.

The outline of this framework begins to take shape in what follows in Part Two: The Defeat of the Western Philosophical Tradition.

DISCUSS ON SG

Pure Satanism

The Russians are now openly and publicly calling out the wicked elite that presently rule over Christendom:

The Epstein case has revealed the real face of the Western elites who are seeking to rule the entire world, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said.

“This topic has exposed the real face of what is called the collective West and the deep state, or rather, an alliance that controls the entire West and is seeking to rule the whole world,” he said in an interview with Itogi Nedely weekly news roundup on the NTV television channel.

“It is unnecessary to explain to any normal person that this is pure Satanism and is beyond human comprehension,” he added.

Epstein is just the tip of the iceberg. It’s a glimpse of the material evil that itself is just a small portion of the much-larger spiritual war.

And remember, the Russians have all the records of the WWII-era death camps. They have all the evidence that they’ve gathered in the parts of Ukraine that have been freed from Clown World rule. Given the way in which their rhetoric is getting stronger in line with the prospects of military victory, they obviously know a lot more than they are now saying publicly or showing the world.

DISCUSS ON SG

The Significance of (d) and (k)

A doctor who has been following the Probability Zero project ran the numbers on the Selective Turnover Coefficient (d) and the mutation fixation rate (k) across six countries from 1950 to 2023, tracking both values against the demographic transition. The results are presented in the chart above, and they are considerably more devastating to the standard evolutionary model than even I anticipated. My apologies to those on mobile phones; it was necessary to keep the chart at 1024-pixel width to make it legible.

Before walking through the charts, a brief reminder of what d and k are. The Selective Turnover Coefficient (d) measures the fraction of the gene pool that is actually replaced each generation. In a theoretical population with discrete, non-overlapping generations—the kind that exists in the Kimura model, biology textbooks, lab bacteria, and nowhere else—d equals 1.0, meaning every individual in the population is replaced by its offspring every generation. In reality, grandparents, parents, and children coexist simultaneously. The gene pool doesn’t turn over all at once; it turns over gradually, with old cohorts persisting alongside new ones. This persistence dilutes the rate at which new alleles can change frequency. The fixation rate k is the rate at which new mutations actually become fixed in the population, expressed as a multiple of the per-individual mutation rate μ. Kimura’s famous invariance equation was that k = μ—that the neutral substitution rate equals the mutation rate, regardless of population size. This identity is the foundation of the molecular clock. As we have demonstrated in multiple papers, this identity is a special case that holds only under idealized conditions that no sexually reproducing species satisfies, including humanity.

Now, to explain the following charts he provided. The top row shows the collapse of d over the past seventy-three years. The upper-left panel tracks d by country. Every country shows the same pattern: d falls monotonically as fertility drops and survival to reproductive age climbs. South Korea and China show the most dramatic collapse, from d ≈ 0.33 in 1950 (when TFR was 5.5) to d ≈ 0.12 in 2023 (TFR 0.9). France and the Netherlands, which entered the demographic transition earlier, started lower and have plateaued around d ≈ 0.09. Japan and Italy sit between, at d ≈ 0.08. The upper-middle panel pools the data by transition type—early, late, and extreme low fertility—and shows the convergence: all three categories are heading toward the same floor. The upper-right panel plots d directly against Total Fertility Rate and reveals a nearly linear relationship (r = 0.942). Fertility drives d. When women stop having children, the gene pool stops turning over. It is that simple.

The second row shows what happens to k as d collapses. The middle-left panel tracks k by country, with the dashed line at k = μ marking Kimura’s prediction. Not a single country, in any year, reaches k = μ. Every data point sits below the line, and the distance from the line has been increasing as k climbs toward a ceiling of approximately 0.5μ. This is the overlap effect: when generations overlap extensively, new mutations entering the population are diluted by the persistence of old allele frequencies, and k converges toward half the mutation rate rather than the full mutation rate. The middle-center panel pools k by transition type and shows all three categories converging on approximately 0.5μ by 2023. The middle-right panel plots k against TFR (r = −0.949): as fertility falls, k rises toward 0.5μ—but never reaches μ. The higher k seems counterintuitive at first, but it reflects the fact that with less turnover, drift rather than selection dominates, and the fixation of neutral mutations approaches its overlap-corrected maximum. The mutations are fixing, but selection is not driving them.

The third row is the knockout punch. The large scatter plot on the left shows d plotted against k across all countries and time points. The Pearson correlation is r = −0.991 with R² = 0.981, p < 0.001. This is not a rough trend or a suggestive pattern. This is a near-perfect linear relationship: d = −2.242k + 1.229. As demographic turnover collapses, fixation rates converge on the overlap limit with mechanical precision. The residual plot on the right confirms that the relationship is genuinely linear—no systematic curvature, no outliers, no hidden nonlinearity. The data points fall on the line like they were placed there by a draftsman.

The bottom panel normalizes everything to 1950 baselines and shows the parallel evolution of d and k across all three transition types. By 2023, d has fallen to roughly 35–45% of its 1950 value in every category. The bars make the asymmetry vivid: d collapses while k barely moves, because k was already near its overlap limit in 1950. Having stopped adapting around 1,000 BC and filtering around 1900 AD, the human genome was already struggling to even drift in 1950. By 2023, genetic drift has essentially stopped.

Now what does this mean for the application of Kimura’s fixation model to humanity?

It means that the identity k = μ—the foundation of the molecular clock, the basis for every divergence date in the standard model—has never applied to human populations in the modern era, and while it applies with increasing accuracy the further back you go, it never actually reaches k = μ even under pre-agricultural conditions, since d never reaches 1.0 for any human population. The data show that k in humans has been approximately 0.5μ or less throughout the entire modern period for which we have reliable demographic data, and was substantially lower than μ even in high-fertility populations. Kimura’s cancellation requires discrete generations with complete turnover. Humans have never had that. So the closer you look at real human demography, the worse the molecular clock performs.

But the implications extend beyond the molecular clock. The collapse of d is not merely a correction factor for dating algorithms. It is a quantitative measurement of the end of natural selection in industrialized populations. A Selective Turnover Coefficient of 0.08 means that only 8% of the gene pool is replaced per generation. A beneficial allele with a selection coefficient of s = 0.01—which would be considered strong selection by population genetics standards—would change frequency by Δp ≈ d × s × p(1−p). At d = 0.08 and initial frequency p = 0.01, that works out to a frequency change of approximately 0.000008 per generation. At that rate, fixation would require on the order of a million years—roughly two hundred times longer than the entire history of anatomically modern Homo sapiens.

The response of the demographic transition to fertility is not a surprise. Every demographer knows that TFR has collapsed across the industrialized world. What these charts show is the genetic consequence of that collapse, quantified with mathematical precision. The gene pool is freezing. Selection cannot operate when the population does not turn over. And the population is not turning over. This is not a prediction, an abstract formula, a theoretical projection, or a philosophical argument. It is six countries, four time points, two independent variables, and a correlation of −0.991. The human genome is frozen, and the molecular clock—which assumed it was running at a constant rate—was never accurately calibrated for the organism it was applied to.

Probability Zero and The Frozen Gene, taken together, are far more than just the comprehensive refutation of Charles Darwin, evolution by natural selection, and the Modern Synthesis. They are also the discovery and explication of one of the greatest threats facing humanity in the 21st and 22nd centuries.

This is the GenEx thesis, published in TFG as Generational Extension and the Selective Turnover Coefficient Across Historical Epochs, now confirmed with hard numbers across the industrialized world. The 35-fold decline in d from the Neolithic to the present that we calculated theoretically from Coale-Demeny life tables is now visible in real demographic data from six countries. Selection isn’t just weakening — it’s approaching zero, and the data show it happening in real time across every population that has undergone the demographic transition.

The human genome isn’t just failing to improve. It’s accumulating damage that it can no longer repair through the only mechanism available to it. Humanity is not on the verge of becoming technological demigods, but rather, post-technological entropic degenerates.

DISCUSS ON SG

A Departure at Dawn

The sun had not yet cleared the Misty Mountains when Gwaihir the Windlord stepped to the edge of the terrace and opened his wings.

It was, by any measure, an extraordinary sight. The Great Eagles of the Misty Mountains were the noblest of all flying creatures in Middle-earth, descended from Thorondor who had scarred the face of Morgoth himself in the Elder Days, and Gwaihir was the greatest of his line. With his wings outstretched, he was thirty fathoms from wingtip to wingtip, his plumage a deep tawny gold shading to white at the breast, his eyes like polished amber set in a head the size of a horse. When he spread his wings on the terrace of Rivendell, the displaced air bent the grass flat in a circle forty feet across and set the pennants on Elrond’s house snapping like whips.

He stood there for a moment in the grey predawn light, his talons gripping the stone at the terrace’s edge, and looked out over the valley of Imladris. Below him the Bruinen ran silver and dark between its wooded banks, and the waterfalls caught the first thin light and held it in long threads of white. The air smelled of pine and cold water and the faintest trace of the kitchens, where someone was already baking bread, because in Rivendell someone was always already baking bread.

On his left talon, buckled with straps of pale leather so fine they might have been spun from spider-silk, hung a pouch no larger than a man’s fist. It was beautiful work, Elvish leathercraft at its most meticulous, with every stitch placed with the precision of a jeweler, and it contained an object of such malice that even Gwaihir, whose mind was as far from the concerns of rings and power as a mind could be, felt a faint unease in the talon that held it. A warmth that had nothing to do with temperature. A weight that had nothing to do with mass.

He ignored it. He was a creature of air, not earth. It was a thing of great earthly power, but whatever it was, it could not touch him.

Behind him, on the terrace, stood Gandalf, leaning on his staff, and Elrond, and the Hobbit — the small one who had offered to carry the thing himself, and who watched now with an expression that Gwaihir, had he been inclined to read the faces of Halflings, might have identified as something between relief and a lingering, wistful sense of having been made unnecessary. Beside the Hobbit stood another, stouter Hobbit who was holding a packed breakfast and looking up at Gwaihir with the frank, uncomplicated awe of someone who has never in his life pretended to be unimpressed by anything.

Gandalf raised his staff. “Fly well, Windlord. Fly high and fly true!”

Gwaihir turned his great head and regarded the wizard with one amber eye. He did not speak — not here, not in the lesser tongues of the earthbound — but he dipped his beak once, a gesture of acknowledgment between peers, and then he stepped off the edge.

For one held breath he fell and dropped like a stone past the terrace’s edge, past the carved balustrades and the trailing ivy, down toward the rushing water far below. Then his wings caught the air and he rose. The downdraft of his ascent shook the trees on both banks of the Bruinen and sent a flock of starlings scattering like thrown seeds. He climbed in a great spiral, each turn carrying him higher, and the morning light found him as he broke above the tree line and caught the gold of his plumage and set it ablaze, so that for a moment he burned against the pale sky like a second dawn, like a fragment of the sun itself given wings and will and sent forth over the world.

It was a sight that even the ancient Elrond, who watched the great eagle’s departure from the balcony of his private residence, found magnificent.

Gwaihir climbed. The valley of Rivendell shrank beneath him. The house of Elrond became a cluster of rooftops among the trees, the Bruinen but a silver thread, the mountains a rumpled cloth of green and grey. The air thinned and cooled and he welcomed it, breathing deep of the upper atmosphere where the wind ran clean and fast and tasted of nothing but sky. He turned south and east, toward the distant shadow on the horizon that was, even from this height, even in the early light, unmistakable. Mordor.

He was not alone.

From the high eyries of the Misty Mountains, where the peaks rose above the snow line into the uttermost airs, two more shapes detached themselves and rose. Landroval, Gwaihir’s brother, and Meneldor the swift. Meneldor was younger and smaller than the others, but, as his name suggested, swift, perhaps faster in flight than any eagle living. They had been waiting since before dawn, perched on the bare rock above the clouds, and now they fell into formation on either side of Gwaihir in a wide arrowhead, three golden shapes climbing in unison toward the roof of the sky.

This was Gandalf’s addition to the plan. Not one eagle but three — an escort, a guard of honor, a redundancy. If one were forced to turn aside, another could take the pouch. If the Nazgûl came, then two could fight them while the Windlord flew on. It was, Gandalf had argued, simple prudence. Gwaihir had accepted this reasoning with the tolerant patience of a creature who did not believe he required any assistance but understood that wizards always needed to feel useful.

The three eagles rose through a thin layer of cloud and emerged above it into a world of blinding white and depthless blue, and they turned their faces toward the East, and they rose higher into the sky.

DISCUSS ON SG

Veriphysics: The Treatise 008

IX. The Inevitable Self-Corruption

The deepest failure of the Enlightenment was not in politics or economics or science. It was in the very premise from which all else followed: the autonomy of reason.

Reason was to be self-grounding, answerable to no external authority. But reason cannot ground itself. Every attempt to provide a rational foundation for reason either assumes what it seeks to prove or regresses infinitely. The Enlightenment’s greatest minds recognized this problem and attempted to solve it, but their solutions have not survived either scrutiny or the experience borne of the passage of time.

Descartes sought certainty in the thinking self, but the existence of the self is precisely what requires demonstration; the cogito is an assumption, not a proof. Hume, being slightly more honest, admitted that reason could establish nothing beyond immediate impressions and the custom of conjunction; causation itself was a habit of mind, not a feature of reality. Kant attempted to rescue reason by distinguishing the phenomenal from the noumenal and confining knowledge to the realm of appearances, but this concession was fatal, because it amounted to an admission that reason could never directly touch reality itself.

The subsequent centuries have traced the consequences of this admission. If reason cannot reach reality, then reason is not discovering truth, it is constructing a variant of it. The positivists of the early twentieth century attempted to restrict knowledge to empirically verifiable propositions, but their criterion of verifiability was itself unverifiable. They constructed a self-refuting standard. The postmodernists of the late twentieth century finally admitted the inevitable result of Enlightenment philosophy: truth is a construction, a social product, an artifact defined by those with the power to enforce it. What counts as knowledge is what the powerful have decided to call knowledge. Reality is what those in authority define it to be. Reason is not a tool for discovering reality; it is merely a weapon in the struggle for dominance.

This is why the scientific authorities can declare that evolution by natural selection is a scientific fact. This is why the government authorities can declare that a married couple is divorced and that a man is truly a woman. In the postmodern world, there is no objective truth or objective reality, literally everything is subjective and capable of being redefined at any moment. War is Peace, Love is Hate, Free Association is Racism, and we have always been at war with Eastasia.

This Orwellian world is not a corruption of the Enlightenment; it is its idealistic completion. If reason is autonomous and answerable to nothing beyond itself, then reason is also groundless. And groundless reason is not reason at all, but sheer will dressed in rational costume. Nietzsche saw this more clearly than anyone: he understood that in Enlightened terms, the will to truth was only a form of the will to power, and those who claimed to serve truth were only serving themselves while wearing a more flattering mask.

The Enlightenment began by enthroning reason and ended by destroying it. The progression from Descartes to Derrida is not a decline or a betrayal, but the logical and inevitable path. Each generation discovered that the previous generation’s stopping point was arbitrary, that the foundations assumed were not foundations at all, that the certainties proclaimed were merely conventions. The Enlightenment’s acid dissolved not only tradition and revelation but eventually reason itself.

The modern West now lives among the ruins. The vocabulary of the Enlightenment persists, and men pay homage to its rights, progress, science, reason, freedom, but the very meanings of those words have been hollowed out entirely. No one can say what a human right is grounded in, or why progress is desirable, or how science differs from ideology, or what reason can legitimately claim, or where freedom ends and license begins. These concepts are invoked ritually, habitually, but they no longer make sense nor command belief. They are just antique furniture sitting in a ruined house whose foundations have collapsed.

DISCUSS ON SG

Super Bowl LX

How can we be at Super Bowl 60? It seems to me like we should be in the late 30s, maybe mid-40s at most.

Anyhow, I expect the Seahawks to win easily. And good for Sam Darnold if they do. I like Mike Vrabel and I like this Patriots team, but they have had the easiest path to the Super Bowl of any team in NFL history.

FIRST HALF OBSERVATIONS:

  • 9-0 Seahawks. Should be at least 17-0 and could easily be 24-0.
  • Great defensive game. The Seattle defense is dominating. The New England defense is taking crazy risks but hasn’t paid for any of them yet.
  • Both coaches are doing very well with what they have. Vrabel is correctly gambling that constant pressure on Darnold is his only chance.
  • Kenny Walker looks like Leveon Bell with speed. Patient and then explosive. Probable MVP if they don’t give it to the entire defensive line, which they should.
  • Sam Darnold is still Sam Darnold. The Vikings were right to let him walk. He still hangs onto the ball too long even when he knows the pressure is coming, and Seattle would be up 17-0 if he was capable of looking down the field under pressure. Two misses, and you could count three given how he had JSN in the end zone but threw it behind him.
  • The New England line has no chance. The left side is being overwhelmed, but Seattle is blitzing effectively from the other side too.
  • The long halftime will help New England’s defense rest. In a normal game, they crack mid-third quarter. Now, it will probably take until the fourth.
  • The only way I see New England winning is if they can get Darnold to turn the ball over 2-3 times. If he just protects the ball, Walker and the defense will secure the win.

SECOND HALF OBSERVATIONS:

  • This is the most dominant defensive performance since the Steelers beat the Vikings 16-6. It probably ranks third, as the Dolphins-Redskins is definitely #1.
  • Kenneth Walker definitely deserved the MVP. The difference between him being patient and finding the holes and Rhamondre Stevenson smashing right into the back of his blockers when there was a visible hole to his right was stark.
  • The New England coaches did a great job. McDaniel had no options because most of that overwhelming pressure was coming from the Seattle front four alone.
  • The commentary was vanilla and inobservant. Saying “Maye just has to make a play” while ignoring what the defense is doing to prevent any plays being made is approaching Tony Romo territory.
  • The interruption caused by the streaker was used by the NFL to give instructions to the coaches. You could see Seattle immediately start laying off the pressure to let New England score. No rush, and the defensive backs just sat back. The tell was the way both coaches reacted; McDonald wasn’t concerned and Vrabel wasn’t fired up. They both knew the game was officially over at that point. Never forget, this is ultimately an entertainment product.
  • I’m pleased for Sam Darnold. He’s a good guy. But definitely no regrets on letting him go. The Vikings were never going to even get to the Super Bowl with him, much less win one, because he can’t win a game like this. Not losing it for the defense was the most he could do, and he managed to do that despite risking a few turnovers with those infuriating pump fakes under pressure on passes he never gets off.

DISCUSS ON SG

Ricardo’s Deliberate Deception

I recently had the privilege of assisting one of the world’s greatest economists in his detective work that comprehensively completes the great work of demolishing the conceptual foundation of the free trade cancer that, far from enriching them, has destroyed the economies of the West. The subsequent paper, The Deliberate Deception in Ricardo’s Defence of Comparative Advantage, was published today by the lead author, Steve Keen. And while it’s a pure coincidence that he happened to notice Ricardo’s textual amphiboly at about the same time that I noticed Kimura’s algebraic amphiboly, I don’t think it’s entirely accidental that two intellectual fixtures of modernity should prove to be constructed on such fundamentally flawed foundations.

Abstract
Ricardo’s arithmetical example of the gains from trade considers only the transfer of labour between industries, and ignores the need to transfer physical capital as well. He discusses the transfer of capital in the subsequent paragraph in Principles, but uses a textual amphiboly: whereas exploiting comparative advantage involves transferring resources from one industry to another in the same country, Ricardo speaks instead of the transfer of resources “from one province to another”. The fact that this verbal deception has escaped attention for over two centuries is in itself notable. When considered in the light of subsequent discussions of capital immobility by Ricardo, this implies that the person whose model led to the allocation of existing resources becoming the foundation of economic analysis, was aware that this foundation was fallacious.

Introduction
The theory of comparative advantage is perhaps the most influential and celebrated result in economics. Challenged by a mathematician to nominate an economic concept that was both “logically true” and “non-obvious”, Samuelson nominated the theory of comparative advantage:

That it is logically true need not be argued before a mathematician; that it is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them.(Samuelson 1969, pp. 1-11)

From Ricardo’s original demonstration in 1817, to modern trade theory, the conclusion has remained constant: even if one nation is more efficient at producing everything than all others, it and its trading partners will gain from specialization and trade.

However, there is an obvious flaw in the logic: while labor can hypothetically be moved between industries at will, fixed capital cannot. Ricardo’s own text contains evidence that he knew that this reality invalidated his theory, since his defense of comparative advantage relied on an amphiboly that conflates two categorically different forms of capital mobility. Remarkably, though this evidence was hiding in plain sight, it has not been noted until now.

The Amphiboly: Province Versus Industry

In Chapter VII of the Principles, Ricardo presents his famous example of England and Portugal trading cloth and wine. Portugal has an absolute advantage in both goods but a comparative advantage in wine; England has a comparative advantage in cloth. Gains to both countries result from specialization according to comparative advantage. Portugal ceases cloth production and England ceases wine production, both countries focus their resources on the industries where they have a comparative advantage, and total output of both cloth and wine rises:

England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may require the labour of 100 men for one year; and if she attempted to make the wine, it might require the labour of 120 men for the same time. England would therefore find it her interest to import wine, and to purchase it by the exportation of cloth. To produce the wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of 80 men for one year, and to produce the cloth in the same country, might require the labour of 90 men for the same time. It would therefore be advantageous for her to export wine in exchange for cloth. This exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the commodity imported by Portugal could be produced there with less labour than in England. Though she could make the cloth with the labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country where it required the labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be advantageous to her rather to employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she would obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth. (Ricardo, Sraffa, and Dobb 1951, p. 135)

Ricardo next explains that international trade means that “England would give the produce of the labour of 100 men, for the produce of the labour of 80”, something which is not sensible with domestic trade. He then states that:

The difference in this respect, between a single country and many, is easily accounted for, by considering the difficulty with which capital moves from one country to another, to seek a more profitable employment, and the activity with which it invariably passes from one province to another in the same country. (Ricardo, Sraffa, and Dobb 1951, p. 136. Emphasis added)

“Province”? Why does Ricardo give the example of moving capital between provinces here? His model involves something categorically different: to exploit comparative advantage, capital must move between industries—from cloth production to wine production.

This is not a minor distinction. Geographic mobility of financial capital means that financial resources can flow to wherever returns are highest—a bank in London can lend to a manufacturer in Yorkshire. Geographic mobility of physical capital means moving equipment by road or canal, rather than by sea and ship. But sectoral mobility of physical capital means that the physical means of production in one industry can become the physical means of production in another—that looms can become wine presses, and vice versa. These are entirely different forms of mobility—one feasible, the other impossible.

Ricardo elsewhere in the Principles demonstrates his awareness of the distinction between physical and financial capital, and the fallacy inherent in treating physical capital as if it has the fungible characteristics of financial capital. In Chapter IV, “On Natural and Market Price,” he explains how the profit rate equalizes across industries: “the clothier does not remove with his capital to the silk trade” (Ricardo, Sraffa, and Dobb 1951, p. 89). Adjustment happens through the financial system, not through physical transformation of productive equipment. Only money moves between industries, and only relative prices change; the looms and the wine presses stay where and as they are.

Read the whole thing on Steve Keen’s site.

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